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Abstract
Abecos is an agent-based e-commerce system under devel-
opment at the Nanyang Technological University. A key
factor in making this system usable in practice is strict se-
curity controls. One aspect of security is the provision of
non-repudiation services. As protocols for non-repudiation
have focused on -message non-repudiation, its adaptation
to aord non-repudiation in a communication session for
two agents in Abecos is inecient. In this work, we inves-
tigate and propose a protocol for enforcing non-repudiation
in a session. The protocol is believed to be applicable in
any e-commerce system; agent- or not agent-based.
1 Introduction
Electronic commerce is an emerging paradigm of business
on the fast growing Internet which holds great potential
and opportunities for business organizations. Besides ac-
cess to new and bigger markets, e-commerce can help to
bring about reduced costs and faster turnaround times by
streamlining and integrating processes along the entire busi-
ness value chain. However, as in any other modes of busi-
ness, we cannot assume that participating parties in an e-
commerce activity play fair and abide by code of moral
conduct. The mere fact that business is being performed
online over an unsecured media is enough to entice criminal
activity to the Internet. Hence, the key factor in making e-
commerce ourish lies in enforcing security in a commerce
system within an unsecured environment. One aspect of
security is the provision of non-repudiation services.
Many non-repudiation protocols have been proposed.
These protocols are mostly described in a wrapper context:
A party A wants to send a message M to B; to enforce
non-repudiation of M , these protocols introduce additional
messages so that collectively, sucient evidence is gathered
and the sending and receipt of M cannot be repudiated.
Hence, non-repudiation is enforced for one message (M) or
an exchange of a message.
In an agent-based e-commerce system, software agents
engage in commerce activities on behalf of buyers and sell-
ers, which can be business organizations or individuals. In
Abecos, we divide the above process of buying and sell-
ing into ve phases|directory search, product information
enquiry, negotiation, and nally, payment and delivery. In
each phase, a sequence of messages are exchanged between
two agents. That is, each phase is a communication ses-
sion between two parties. For consumers to rely on soft-
ware agents in a system such as Abecos, we need security
and accountability in each of the sessions. Having a non-
repudiation service enforced prevents any communicating
party from denying any action it has committed.
Direct adaptation of known non-repudiation protocols
result in message and trac overheads because they are
designed for the tranmission of one message only. In this
paper, we propose a non-repudiation protocol for a commu-
nication session in an agent-based e-commerce system. This
paper is a documentation of our preliminary and ongoing
work in enforcing security in an e-commerce system.
2 Related Work
Non-repudiation protocols are either based on a trusted
third party or on the gradual exchange of information. For
the former, third party communication is a bottleneck while
the latter places a heavy load on communication resources.
There are some non-repudiation protocols which use a (non-
trusted) third party either to deliver the message or to gen-
erate, extract or keep the required evidences. In this sec-
tion, we briey review three of these protocols.
2.1 Fair Non-Repudiation Protocol
(FNP)
One important key in a non-repudiation protocol is to en-
sure that both communicating parties are neither at any
advantageous position at any instance of the communicat-
ing phases. A Fair Non-repudiation Protocol (FNP) was
proposed in [23]. Its objective is to provide the origina-
tor and recipient with valid irrefutable evidences after the
completion of the protocol, without giving any party an ad-
vantage at any point during the execution of the protocol.
Assuming that each entity is equipped with its own pair
of public keys for digital signature and verication, the pro-
tocol is best summarized formally as follows.:
1: A! B : f
EOO
; B; L; C;EOO
2: B ! A : f
EOR
; A; L;EOR
3: A! TTP : f
SUB
; B;L;K; sub
K
4: B $ TTP : f
CON
; A;B; L;K; con
K
5: A$ TTP : f
CON
; A;B; L;K; con
K
It should also be noted that in this fair non-repudiation
protocol, the ciphertext C (encrypted by key K), is not
used for condentiality purposes. The explaination of the
notation used and a more elaborate discussion of this pro-
tocol can be found in [23].
2.2 Certied Electronic Mail Protocol
(CMP)
A Certied electronic Mail Protocol (CMP) was proposed
in [2]. The protocol uses the same idea as FNP and involves
three parties: the mail sender A, the mail recipient B, and
the Trusted Third Party TTP. There are two variations
of the CMP model: CMP1 and CMP2. The dierence be-
tween the two is that CMP2 provides content condentiality
protection; in CMP1, the encrypted message and the key
is passed to the third party for decryption while in CMP2,
only the key, which is encrypted under the third party's
public key, is sent. The responsibility of decrypting the ci-
phertext lies with B. Since the size of the key is usually
smaller than the size of the message, it is more ecient
to use CMP2 than CMP1. Protocol CMP2 is described as
follows:
1: A! B : A;B;TTP; H(M); e(V
P
; K);
e(K;M + EOO)
2: B ! TTP : A;B;TTP; H(M); e(V
TTP
; K);
e(K;M + EOO);EOR
3: TTP ! B : A;B;TTP; H(M); e(V
B
; K);
EOO
TTP
4: TTP ! A : A;B;TTP; H(M);EOR; EOD
As pointed out in [2], the problem of selective receipt
of the decrypted session key may happen at the last step.
Three approaches to solve the problem are proposed in the
paper [2]. The CMP protocol also suers from one major
drawback. The mail is transmitted at least twice in the
protocol. Although the protocol reaches the lower bounds
on the number of messages and rounds, it is not ecient
when the mail item becomes very large.
2.3 Optimistic Fair Exchange
Asokan et al. proposed a protocol for fair exchange [9]
where the third party is involved only when a player cheats
or plays unfairly, or in the event of a fault in the commu-
nication. The main idea underlying the protocol is that
both principals start by promising each other the exchange
of information. The information is then exhanged for non-
repudiation evidences during the course of the protocol. If
anything goes wrong during the run of the protocol, an
error recovery phase is initiated. The party initiating the
recovery will then have to sent all the messages exchanged
previously to the third party to solve the dispute.
3 Non-Repudiation in A Session
The motivation underlying the design of a non-repudiation
protocol for use in a session is that in an e-commerce system
such as Abecos, non-repudiation service is invoked several
times and across dierent phases. In Abecos, we need non-
repudiation service in the enquiry, negotiation and payment
phases. As such, we would like to view a series of message
transfers that span across dierent phases of Abecos as a
non-repudiation session.
In this section, we propose a protocol NRSP (Non-
Repudiation Session Protocol) for to provide fair non-
repudiation in a session. We dene a session as a series
of request-response messages between two parties A and B:
A sends the rst message; B processes the received mes-
sage and formulates the response and sends it back to A;
A processes the reply and formulates the next message for
B; and so on. The process continues for a consecutive se-
quence of messages until one party calls for termination of
the session. Ideally, the protocol should incur less message
overheads than direct application of FNP and CMP on each
of the messages in the session.
3.1 Symbols and Notations
In this protocol, we attempt to make the non-repudiation
session a fair one. Let us dene the following notations to
be used in this protocol:
 f : A ag denoting the purpose of the message.
 K: Symmetric key used for encrypting a message.
 V : Public key of a principal identied in the subscript.
 token
n
: An nth token consisting of the session iden-
tication number, SessId, and the message sequence
number n.
 e(K
An
;M
An
): Encryption of nth message send by
party A. using symmetric key K
An
.
 N
A
and N
B
: A secret number between A and TTP
or B and TTP . This number is known to them only
when the parties requests for opening of a session.
 key info
An
: Data items consisting of K
An
, N
A
,
sS
B
(token
n
).
 e(V
TTP
; key info
An
): Encryption of key information
using TTP 's public key, V
TTP
.
 sS
A
(data items) or sS
B
(data items): Signature of A
or B on the particular data items.
 P
1
$ P
2
: P
1
performs a ftp get operation on P
2
in
order to retrieve some data items.
 EOR
n
= sS
B
(A; token
n
;M
n
): Evidence of receipt of
the nth message.
For generality purposes, parties A and B are used to denote
sender and recipient respectively in the explanatory of the
notations above. In the following sections, we will use A and
B to mean two individual parties in communication. Both
parties are capable of sending and receiving messages.
3.2 Opening of A Session
When party A and B request for opening of a session, a
secret number N
A
, N
B
is given to them respectively. These
secret numbers are known only to A or B themselves and
also to TTP . It is used so that TTP is able to ascertain the
identity of the party sending the encrypted key to the re-
ceiver. These secret numbers replaces the digital signatures
that would otherwise be needed for the purpose. Verica-
tion of digital signatures is generally more time consuming
than just performing a table lookup on the secret number.
The exchanges of messages in the session starts o by
having the party whom is expecting to receive the rst mes-
sage to send out the rst token of the session. Suppose A
is the rst sender, we have the following ow of data:
 B ! A : f
token
; token
1
; sS
B
(f
token
; token
1
)
The token is a string of numbers consisting of the SessId
and the sequence number of the message. It provides the
control over the ow of messages in sequence within the
session. As an analogy, we can view a token as a numbered
return envelope. Without the return envelope from the in-
tended recipient, the sender cannot send the message. The
use of token is further described in the following sections.
3.3 Exchanging of Messages
The main idea of our protocol is to encrypt the intended
message using a symmetric key. The key is further en-
crypted using the third party's public key. The encrypted
key and the cipher text are then sent to the recipient. The
recipient, upon receiving the message in encrypted form,
will not be able to read the content and hence he sends the
key encrypted with TTP 's public key to the TTP for de-
cryption. The non-repudiation evidence of origin is gener-
ated when the sender signs the encrypted message digitally
using his private key and TTP published the symmetric
key. The evidence for non-repudiation of receipt is gener-
ated when the recipient signs the message to request for the
key.
The steps below shows the use of the protocol in a ses-
sion starting from nth message: (We assume that A has
obtained token
n
)
1: A! B : f
SMsg
; B; token
n+1
; e(V
TTP
; K
An
+
N
A
+ sS
B
(token
n
)); e(K
An
;M
n
);
sS
A
(token
n+1
); signature of A;
EOR
n 1
:
where signature of A = sS
A
(f
SMsg
; B; e(V
TTP
;
K
An
+N
A
+ sS
B
(token
n
)); e(K
An
;M
n
)):
A sends the nth encrypted message to B. The key infor-
mation is in turn encrypted using TTP 's public key. The
key information that A has to include consists of his secret
number with TTP , B's signature on the token
n
, as well as
the key used to encrypt or decrypt the message. In addi-
tion, A will also send the (n+ 1)th token and the evidence
of receipt of the previous message to B. B at this point
in time, will check the validity of the message by verifying
the digital signature of A on the message, on the token
n+1
and on the previous message. Thus, B would have obtained
the evidence of receipt for the previous, n   1th message.
2: B ! TTP : f
GKey
; A; token
n
; e(V
TTP
; K
An
+N
A
+ sS
B
(token
n
));
sS
B
(f
GKey
; A; token
n
; e(V
TTP
;
K
An
+N
A
+ sS
B
(token
n
))):
When TTP receives the request from B, he will verify the
signature of B. And if it is valid, TTP will proceed to de-
crypt the key information using his own private key. A table
lookup will be performed on N
A
to check that it matches
the secret number he has with A. Next, TTP uses same
public key of B to verify that B has signed token
n
. In ad-
dition, TTP checks with his database entry to ensure that
the token
n
is a valid sequence. Once veried, TTP is as-
certained that A and B are communicating with the right
party and the message sequence number is matched and
valid.
The TTP will retain the signature of B and store in
its database for a designated period of time. TTP will
also store the decrypted key in a public directory where
B can retrieve it. We note that the key used for en-
cryption of the message is not to provide condentiality
of the message but to support non-repudiation service.
3: B $ TTP : f
Key
; A;B; token
n
; K
An
;
sS
TTP
(f
Key
; A;B; token
n
; K
An
)
B will retrieve the encrypted key which he sends to TTP
for decryption after an agreed time duration. Thus, it is
the recipient's responsibility to get the key from TTP ; this
avoids the problem of selective receipt . Consider the case if
TTP is to send the decrypted key back to the recipient. The
recipient can choose not to acknowledge the receipt of the
key even if he has received it; thus the sender is at a disad-
vantaged position. This is the problem of selective receipt.
The mode of retrieval is proposed to be a ftp get operation.
4: B ! A : f
SMsg
; A; token
n+2
; e(V
TTP
;
K
B(n+1)
+N
B
+ sS
A
(token
n+1
));
e(K
B(n+1)
;M
n+1
); sS
B
(token
n+2
);
signature of B;EOR
n
:
where signature of B = sS
B
(f
SMsg
; A;
e(V
TTP
; K
B(n+1)
+N
B
+ sS
A
(token
n+1
));
e(K
B(n+1)
;M
n+1
))):
After B has processed the message and formulated a re-
sponse, he then sends a reply using the same protocol again.
In the event that B does not send the evidence of receipt
to the sender after obtaining the decryption key from TTP ,
the sender A may then start a recovery phase.
1: A$ TTP : f
Key
; A;B; token
n
; K
An
;
sS
TTP
(f
Key
; A;B; token
n
; K
An
)
(Party A retrieves the evidence of publication of key from
TTP .)
2: A! TTP : f
GSub
; B; token
n
; sS
A
(f
GSub
;
B; token
n
)
(Party A further request that TTP send him the ev-
idence that B submitted the encrypted key to TTP .)
3: TTP ! A : f
KSub
; A;B; sS
B
(f
GKey
; A;
token
n
; e(V
TTP
; K
An
+N
A
+
sS
B
(token
n
)); signature of TTP:
where signature of TTP = sS
TTP
(f
KSub
; A;B;
sS
B
(f
GKey
; A; token
n
; e(V
TTP
; K
An
+N
A
+
sS
B
(token
n
)))
(TTP grants A's request and send him the evidence.)
In the recovery phase, A simply obtains from the third
party, the evidence that the B has sent the key for decryp-
tion and that the TTP has published the key. Using these
evidences, A can prove that B has indeed received his mes-
sage.
4 Verication of Fairness
Let us examine the examine the fairness of this protocol by
looking at the most critical step in this protocol. When B
has retrieved the key from TTP , B can choose to continue
with the session and send EOR to A or to play unfairly by
ending this protocol abruptly.
If B does not play fair such that A will not receive the
EOR
n
of the nth message (B stops at step 3), A will then
have to get the evidences from TTP . From the evidences
he gathered, he can then prove to the judge that B has
indeed sent a request to TTP to decrypt the key for the
nth message in the session. And also prove that TTP has
veried the validity of the request and published the key
publicly.
At this point in time, the judge is convinced that B
must have received the encrypted key and some form of
the nth encrypted message from A. To be fair to B, the
judge request B to forward the nth message in the session
which B received from A. If A tries to fake an nth message
dierent from the one he actually sent to B and claims that
B has actually received the one which he made up, the data
items and evidence provided by B would be able to tell.
The judge can verify A's signature on the encrypted key
and encrypted message of the nth message which is pro-
vided by B. And then, the judge compares the encrypted
message which B receives and the one A claims to have
sent. If they are the same, the judge concludes that B has
received the nth message. If not, the judge concludes that
A's claim should be rejected.
5 Eciency Analysis
Now consider a simple session where a command is sent to
a party and a response was returned. CMP and FNP each
takes 8 and 10 messages respectively to accomplish the ses-
sion. In the case of NRSP, we nd that we need 6 messages
plus 1 message for obtaining the evidence of receipt for the
reply. Therefore, a total of 7 messages are needed. (We
have omitted the overhead incurred when establishing and
terminating the session.)
Clearly, when we extrapolate the simple session to con-
sist of n consecutive command-response messages, the over-
head becomes insignicant. Thus, we have:
Result 1 For n consecutive command-response messages,
CMP, FNP and NRSP incur 8n, 10n and 6n+ 1 messages
respectively. Therefore, the savings in terms of the number
of messages is at least 2n  1, or approximately 12:5%.
It can be shown that if we assume the following size:
 key used for DES is 56-bits in length,
 identiers and token are 32-bits in size,
 ag used in the protocols are negligible in size,
 mail identier (L), digital signatures, output of the
hash function are 128-bits,
 actual message size is 1,024 bytes,
 secret number is 16-bit,
Then, for n > 12, NRSP is more ecient.
Result 2 The amount of byte overhead saved when using
NRSP over FNP for a session consisting of n two-message
exchanges in O(n).
6 Conclusions
Non-repudiation service protects a party involved in a
transaction against the other party denying that a partic-
ular event or action took place. In this paper, we pre-
sented a non-repudiation protocol NRSP that can be used
in a session where messages are being exchanged consec-
utively. The need for this protocol arises in the Abecos
research system where buyer and seller agents representing
businesses and individual engage in commerce activities.
As agents progress from one phase of activity to another,
NRSP can be used to provide and enforce non-repudiation
within a phase. We believe this protocol is applicable in
any e-commerce system; agent- or not agent-based.
In this paper, we have shown that NRSP is more ecient
than CMP and FNP in terms of the message overhead. We
compare and show that it is more ecient than simple adap-
tations of existing protocols. As part of our ongoing work
on the Abecos research project, we shall be looking into
improving NRSP further. In particular, we will attempt to
improve the protocol so that there is less reliance on the
third party.
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